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THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF NON-RECOGNITION OF
GOVERNMENTS
The question of the legal effects of non-recognition of govern-
ments' is one of the most controversial branches of international
law. It is the subject of considerable theorizing on the part of
writers in the field' and frequent litigation in court. The focal point
of many of the difficulties facing the courts is the doctrine that
recognition is a political question and that courts are bound by
executive determination.3 Since certain cases involving unrecog-
nized governments do not require the decision of a political ques-
tion, the problem is that of determining when the doctrine is ap-
plicable. Before the Twentieth Century the doctrine in the United
States raised few problems. This was due mainly to our recognition
policy. The United States generally accorded recognition on the
basis of effectiveness of the particular government. 4 Continued
non-recognition of the government was an indication that the gov-
ernment was unstable and had not attained the status of a "sover-
eign." The fact that the political departments were considered more
competent5 to determine the status of sovereign was one of the
reasons for the doctrine.
But in the Twentieth Century and particularly with respect to
1. For the purpose of this Note the term "government" will include
the term "states."
2. Controversy over what is the exact legal nature of recognition has
been the subject of a number of articles and books. Most of the conflict has
been between adherents of the so-called constitutive and declaratory theories
of recognition. The constitutive view is that recognition is a prerequisite
to the State's becoming an international person. See 1 Oppenheim, Inter-
national Law 142-144 (4th ed., McNair, 1928). This view has been severely
criticized by many writers. See Chen, The International Law of Recognition
30-46 (1951) ; Jaffee, Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations 87-103 (1933) ;
Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 52-54 (1947); Brown, The
Effects of Recognition, 36 Am. J. Int'l L. 106 (1942). The declaratory
view is that a State attains legal stature as soon as it "exists" as a fact, i.e.,
as soon as it fulfills the conditions of statehood required by international
law. Recognition is merely a formal declaration of this fact. See Lauterpacht,
op. cit. supra, at 41. The declaratory view has been criticized by Lauter-
pacht. Id. at 43-51. See also an examination, pro and con, of the view by
Chen, op. cit. supra, at 62-78. The practice of American courts in recent
years seems to have adopted the constitutive theory of recognition. See, e.g.,
The faret, 145 F. 2d 431, 441-442 (3d Cir. 1944). The pre-Soviet cases, on
the other hand, were more consonant with the declaratory theory of recog-
nition. See Consul of Spain v. La Conception, 6 Fed. Cas. 359, 360, No.
3,137 (C.C.D. S.C. 1819), rev'd on other grounds, 6 Wheat. 235 (U.S. 1821).
3. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890).
4. See instructions sent to the American Minister in Colombia by the
Secretary of State. 1 Moore, Digest of Internation Law 139 (1906).
5. Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 50 (U.S. 1852). See Tennant,
Recognition Cases in American Courts, 1923-1930, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 708,
709 (1931).
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Soviet Russia recognition has been denied even though there could
be no doubt that the government in question had achieved internal
control. The doctrine, however, is still supportable on the ground
that it would be embarrassing to the political departments if courts
were to differ with them on matters of foreign affairs.( The ques-
tion then is when the facts of a particular case involve a matter of
foreign affairs so as to preclude judicial inquiry.
The cases fall into three major categories: those concerned
with the question of the capacity of an unrecognized government to
sue; those involving an assertion of immunity from suit by the
unrecognized government; and those dealing with the question of
the legal effect to be given the acts or legislation of the unrecognized
government.
CAPACITY OF UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT TO SUE
The earliest British cases dealing with the question of whether
an unrecognized government can be a suitor in court involved a dis-
pute over certain Swiss funds.7 Thus in City of Berne in Switzer-
land v. The Bank of England8 the new government brought suit
to restrain transfer of funds deposited by the defunct government in
the Bank of England. Lord Eldon, in refusing relief, remarked that
it was difficult to say that a court can take notice of a government
not authorized by the government of the country in which the court
sits.9 Although Lord Eldon seemed to have taken an inconsistent
position a year later, 0 the Berne case nevertheless is considered to
be an authoritative declaration of the rule that an unrecognized
de facto government has no standing in court to bring suit."
The first American case on the point was Thw Hornet,2 which
involved a proceeding against a vessel for violation of the neu-
trality laws. An agent of a group of revolutionaries in Cuba (the
6. See The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294, 296 (N.D. Cal. 1920); Dickinson,
The Unrecognized Govermnent or State in English and American Law. 22
Mich. L. Rev. 29, 118, 133 (1923) ; Tennant, mupra note 5, at 709-710.
7. The City of Berne in Switzerland v. The Bank of England, 9 Ves.
347 (Ch. 1804) ; Dolder v. The Bank of England, 10 Ves. 352 (Ch. 1805);
Dolder v. Lord Huntingfield, 11 Ves. 283 (Ch. 1805).
8. 9 Ves. 347 (Ch. 1804).
9. Id. at 348.
10. "I cannot affect to be ignorant of the fact, that the Revolutions in
Switzerland have not been recognised by the government of this country:
but as a Judge I cannot take notice of that" Dolder v. The Bank of Eng-
land, 10 Ves_352, 354 (Ch. 1805).
11. See Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 2, at 44; Dickinson, supra
note 6, at 31-32, 122. But see Borchard, The Unrecogniced Government in
American Courts, 26 Am. J. Iftll L. 261, 265 (1931).
12. 12 Fed. Cas. 529. No. 6,705 (D.C.D.N.C. 1870).
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"Republic of Cuba") filed leave to intervene which was denied on
the basis that the insurgent government was unrecognized. The
language of the court would seem to indicate that access to our
courts would be denied to unrecognized governments in every case.
The "Republic of Cuba" had not, however, achieved territorial
security nor had it even been recognized as a belligerent. 3
The most extensive case development of the law of recognition
in the United States was the result of our relationship with Soviet
Russia.'4 The United States Government refused to recognize the
Soviet Government even though it had secured territorial control
of Russia. On the other hand, the United States Government con-
tinued to recognize the Kerensky regime long after it had ceased
being the effective government of Russia. By basing the denial of
recognition upon reasons other than stability the State Department
created difficult legal questions. The problem of whether Soviet
Russia could be a suitor in court was summarily handled by cate-
gorically denying it acces to our courts. The earlier "Russian" cases
involved actions brought by the Soviet Government in the federal
courts to secure possession of certain ships.1' The Soviet Govern-
ment claimed title as the successor of the preceding government.
The defunct Kerensky Government contested the actions and they
were dismissed on the ground that the Soviet Government was
not the recognized representative of the State of Russia.
It should be observed that at this time the non-recognition of
Soviet Russia was affirmatively asserted. The State Department had
suggested in a letter directed to the District Courts that the Soviet
Government was not in any way to be considered the recognized
government of Russia.'6 Furthermore, it has been suggested that
the Soviet Government had not at this time attained such stability
that there was no question of its de facto status.17 Premature recog-
nition of sovereignty on the part of courts might be considered as
much of an insult to the preceding government as would such an
action by the State Department.'8
The Soviet Government was also denied access to our courts
13. See Jaffee, op. cit. supra note 2, at 141.
14. The main pre-recognition cases are cited in United States v.
Manhattan Co., 276 N. Y. 396, 403, 12 N. E. 2d 518, 521-522 (1938).
15. The Penza, 277 Fed. 91 (E.D. N.Y. 1921); The Rogdai, 278 Fed.
294 (N.D. Cal. 1920) ; The Rogday, 279 Fed. 130 (N.D. Cal. 1920).
16. See The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294, 295 (N.D. Cal. 1920).
17. See Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts,
26 Am. J. Int'l L. 261,266 (1931).
18. See 1 Oppenheim, International Law 148-149 (4th ed., McNair,
1931).
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in Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario.1 a later
New York decision. In that case the Soviet Government brought
suit to compel an accounting by one of its buying agents in the
United States. In dismissing the action the court reasoned that a
foreign power may bring an action in our courts only on the basis of
international comity and until the government is recognized so such
comity exists. The court added that "recognition and consequently
the existence of comity is purely a matter for the determination of
the legislative or executive departments of the government."-"
The Cibrario case presented a somewhat different situation than
the federal decisions. First of all, the issue before the court was
whether a stable unrecognized government could bring suit in our
courts. Moreover, the possibility of embarrassing the Executive
Department was not as great since there was no contest between
opposing factions over who was the representative of the State
of Russia. The Soviet Government brought suit not as a successor
government but as an owner protecting funds which it had invested
in this country.21 Furthermore, the United States government had
not forbidden commercial intercourse between the Soviet Govern-
ment and the citizens in this country nor had it prohibited the Soviet
Government from placing its funds in the United States. It would,
therefore, seem only fair to both an unrecognized government and
to citizens engaging in trade to protect the transactions which have
arisen from this relationship. Leaving the funds of an unrecognized
government free to anyone who wants to help himself may cause
greater international complications than allowing the government
to sue. At least some sort of temporary receivership should be de-
vised pending recognition so as to protect the property.--'
Such a solution was arrived at in an analogous situation in a
recent lower federal court decision.2 3 In that case the Bank of
China, a corporation represented by emigre directors appointed
by the Nationalist Government of China, brought suit to recover
19. 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923).
20. Id. at 262, 139 N. E. at 259. A suit brought subsequently by mem-
bers of the Cinematographic Committee of the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic was dismissed upon the ground that they were merely
agents of the Republic. Preobazhenski v. Cibrario, 192 N. Y. Supp. 275 (Sup.
Ct. 1922).
21. See Comment, 31 Yale :L. J. 534 (1922). Jaffee argues that this
distinction is artificial. The State rather than the government owns the
property and therefore when internal governments change succession is not
involved. See Jaffee, op. cit. supra note 2, at 154.
22. See Dickinson, supra note 6, at 124.
23. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 92 F.
Supp. 920 (N.D. Cal. 1950), appeal dismissed and cause remanded, 190 F. 2d
1010 (9th Cir. 1951).
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funds deposited in the Wells Fargo Bank. Attorneys for the direc-
tors appointed by the Central Peoples Government filed a motion to
dismiss the action or to substitute themselves as attorneys of record.
The court held that the trial would be continued sine die, entrust-
ing the funds with the court or an approved trustee until such time
as either Communist China becomes a stable, recognized govern-
ment or the Nationalist Government has secured control of China.
Thus the case reveals what can be done when, because of inter-
national developments, it is impracticable to favor either the de facto
unrecognized government or the de jure recognized government.
Dickinson argues that unrecognized governments should have
standing in court for the limited purpose of protecting public prop-
erty or other interests.
2 4
Notwithstanding the criticism of the Cibrario case by leading
writers in the field22 it has been cited in later cases. 6 However, some
of the force of the decision has been removed by cases allowing suits
by corporations owned solely by the unrecognized government.2 7
But in none of these cases is there any language which indicates
disapproval of Cibrario case.
2 8
IMMUNITIES OF THE UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENTS
The unrecognized government which apperently may nevei
sue in courts in the United States is protected from suit. Thus in
the leading case of WVulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic20 the court held that an unrecognized government de facto
could not be sued for an act of confiscation within its own territory.
The court said:
24. See Dickinson, supra note 6, at 134.
25. See Jaffee, op. cit. supra note 2, at 149-156; Borchard, The Un-
recognized Government in American Courts, 26 Am. J. Int'l L. 261, 266
(1931) ; Fraenkel, The Juristic Status of Foreign States, Their Property
and Their Acts, 25 Col. L. Rev. 544, 550-551 (1925).
26. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 137(1938) ; Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 109 F. 2d 635, 637 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U. S. 670 (1940) ; Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y.
220, 224, 186 N. E. 679, 681 (1933) ; Sokoloff v. National City Bank of New
York, 239 N. Y. 158, 164, 145 N. E. 917, 918 (1924).
27. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481 (1931);
Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F. 2d 524 (Cust. & Pat. App.
1934). But cf. Preobazhenski v. Cibrario, 192 N. Y. Supp. 275 (Sup. Ct.
1922).
28. Only one American case can be found in which an unrecognized
government was allowed to sue. This is an unreported Massachusetts case
where the unrecognized government of Mexico asked for a temporary re-
straining order to prevent disposition by a former Mexican official of funds
deposited in a Massachusetts bank. The order was granted. For a detailed
report of the case by Quincy Wright see Comment, 17 Am. J. Int'l L. 742,
743-745 (1923).
29. 234 N. Y. 372,138 N. E. 24 (1923).
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"They [our courts] may not bring a foreign sovereign before
our bar, not because of comity, but because he has not submitted
himself to our laws .... Concedingly that is so as to a foreign
government that has received recognition. ... In either case
to do so would vex the peace of nations .... Unwittingly it [the
court] would find itself involved in disputes it might think un-
wise. . . The question is a political one, not confided to the
courts but to another department of the government." 3)
Writers have approved of the decision 31 and immunity from suit has
since been extended to other unrecognized governments. 32
The Wulfsohn case could have been limited to suits where the
property in question was not within the court's jurisdiction. This
possibility was dispelled in Banque de France v. Equitable Trust
Co.3 3 where certain gold confiscated by the Soviets in Russia and
shipped to the defendants in New York was held to be immune from
judicial process. Certain language of the court in the Wnlfsohn
case also indicated that the grant of immunity was limited to gov-
ernmental acts.34 But later in Voevodine v. Government of the
Comnmander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia33
immunity was accorded to the emphemeral Denikin government in
a suit based upon a breach of contract. Thus it would seem that
with respect to the sovereign itself non-recognition is immaterial in
determining jurisdictional immunmit. Of course, to refuse immunity
to an unrecognized government would be contrary to the rationale
of the doctrine relating to recognition. Refusal would indeed pre-
cipitate the courts into the political arena.3 6
There is a further question of whether immunity should extend
to public ships or other property of the unrecognized government.
Logically the rule should be the same. In quasi-in-rem actions
because the defendant in the original action is immune, the property
has generally been held to be immune from attachment or other
judicial process.37 It would seem quite possible, however, that
property in an in rem action would not be immune. This strange
30. Id. at 376, 138 N. E. at 26.
31. Borchard, The Unrecogidzed Government in American Courts. 26
Am. J. Int'l L. 261, 264-265 (1931) ; Dickinson, supra note 6, at 128; Ten-
nant, supra note 5, at 711-712, 714-715.
32. Voevodine v. Government of the Commander-in-Chief, 257 N. Y.
557, 178 N. E. 793 (1931) (memorandum decision) ; Nankivel v. Omsk
All-Russian Government, 237 N. Y. 150, 157, 142 N. E. 569, 570 (1923).
33. 33 F. 2d 202 (S.D. N.Y. 1929).
34. Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N. Y.
372, 376, 138 N. E. 24, 26 (1923).
35. 257 N. Y. 557, 178 N. E. 793 (1931) (memorandum decision).
36. See Dickinson, supra note 6, at 128.
37. Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F. 2d 202 (S.D. N.Y.
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result would be due to the rule in Ex parte Mir's which sets forth
the methods in which immunity must be asserted. In order to claim
immunity the sovereign or an accredited representative must either
appear in the suit itself or obtain a "suggestion" from the executive
department that the property is immune.39 Unrecognized govern-
ments would most likely be refused a suggestion of immunity from
the State Department and it is doubtful whether such governments
could intervene as parties in the in rem action.40 In a case involving
a government with whom the United States had severed diplomatic
relations such a result was reached. The Secretary of State refused
to make any suggestion of immunity and the assertion of immunity
by the master of the ship was held to be of no effect.
41
ACTS OR LEGISLATION OF THE UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT
Cases dealing with the effect of non-recognition upon the rights
of individuals or corporations are the most frequent of all recogni-
tion cases. The problem arise when, under the ordinary conflict
of laws rules, the law of the foreign nation whose government is
unrecognized is to be applied. The question then is what legal effect,
if any, will the act or legislation of the unrecognized power be given.
Before 1920 there were relatively few decisions dealing with
the validity of the act of an unrecognized government. The only
significant judicial development concerned the legal effect to be
1929); Nankivel v. Omsk All-Russian Government, 257 N. Y. 150, 142
N. E. 569 (1923); Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Re-
public, 234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923).
38. 254 U. S. 522 (1921).
39. Id. at 532-533. See also Compania Espanola v. Navemar, 303 U. S.
68, 74 (1938). When the claim of immunity is asserted through diplomatic
channels and allowed by the Executive Department, that precludes further
judicial inquiry into the claim. Exv parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578 (1943) ; see
Compania Espanola v. Navemar, supra, at 74-75. However, if the govern-
ment appears as claimant, the question of immunity may be decided by the
courts;. Difficulties have arisen because the State Department instead of
either denying the claim of immunity or "suggesting" immunity has some-
times pursued a hazy middle course, asserting that they are presenting the
claim for proper consideration by the court as a matter of comity between
the United States and the government in question. No specific commitment is
made on the matter by the State Department. See Riesenfeld, Sovereign
hmznity of Foreign, Vessels in Anglo-American Law: The Evolution of
a Leqal Doctrine, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 50-51 n. 192 (1940). Usually the court
has inquired into the validity of the claim of immunity where this form of
"suggestion' is presented. Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N. Y. 362, 20
N. E. 2d 81 (1939) ; Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute,
260 App. Div. 189, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 825 (1st Dep't 1940).
40. Leave to intervene was refused to an unrecognized government in
The Hornet, 12 Fed. Cas. 529, No. 6,705 (D.C.D.N.C. 1870). See Feller,
Procedure in Cases Involhing hnmunity of Foreign States in Courts of the
United States, 25 Am. J. Int'l L. 83, 96 (1931).
41. The Gul Djemal. 264 U. S. 90 (1924).
19521
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given the various legislative and judicial acts within the territory of
the Confederate States of America.4 2 These cases arose after the
Civil War. The United States Supreme Court adopted the position
that unless the particular acts of the Confederate States aided the
rebellion they would be valid even though emanating from an un-
lawful government.4 3 The Civil War cases are perhaps distinguish-
able from cases involving the non-recognition of external govern-
ments since the necessity of preserving internal order after the
war was an important factor in their determination.44 Nevertheless
the cases are significant in that they do not look to the fact of
recognition or the lack of it as the sole criterion in determining
whether the acts will be given legal effect.
A few years later a group of state court cases involving the
then unrecognized Mexican Government were decided.45 The most
controversial case decided during this period was Pelzer v. United
Dredging Co. 46 In that case a New York court decided an adminis-
trator appointed by a Mexican court did not have the right to
maintain an action on certain notes payable to the deceased nor
could such an appointment be a basis for an ancillary proceeding.
The court based its decision upon the sole ground that the particular
revolutionary group in territorial control of Mexico had not been
recognized as the legitimate government of Mexico. The territory
of Mexico did at this time have a relatively effective legal system,
and there was apparently no lack of ability on the part of the
Mexican court to adequately perform the function of appointing
an administrator.47 Moreover it could hardly be contended that
any political purpose was served by the decision. The Pelzer case
42. There were a few isolated cases involving the acts of de facto
governments decided during the earlier part of the Nineteenth Century.
Keene v. McDonough, 8 Pet. 308 (U.S. 1834) (an adjudication by a
Spanish tribunal made after the cession of Louisiana to the United States
given effect) ; United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246 (U.S. 1819) (during the
War of 1812, legal effect given to the imposition of import duties by the
British officials during the occupancy of the American port of Castine).
43. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (U.S. 1868) ; see Horn v. Lockhart,
17 Wall. 570, 580 (U.S. 1873). See Houghton, The Validity of the Acts of
Unrecognized De Facto Governments in the Courts of Non-rccognizhk
States, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 216-220 (1929).
44. See Horn v. Lockhart, 1.7 Wall. 570, 580 (U.S. 1873).
45. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Cem ral Leather Co., 87 N. J. L. 552, 94 Atl.
789 (1915), aff'd sub nomn. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297
(1918) (upholding the acts of military forces under the authority of General
Villa); Compania M. Y. R. R., S. A. v. Bartlesville Zinc Co., 115 Tex. 21,
275 S. W. 388 (1925) (referring to these same acts as "banditry" and re-
fusing to give them effect).
46. Reported by Dickinson in 22 Mich. L. Rev. 29-30 (1923).
47. Id. at 30-31.
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has consequently been criticized by writers48 and its mechanical ap-
proach to the problem was repudiated by a later New York de-
cision.""
Most of the other cases involved the unrecognized Soviet Gov-
ernment. The unrecognized but effective Soviet Government was,
of course, quite capable of exercising normal governmental powers
and courts were consequently faced with the problem of deciding
the validity of its varying decrees (notably the so-called "national-
ization" decrees) and legislation. The majority of these cases were
decisions by New York state courts involving Soviet confiscatory
decrees purporting to affect persons or assets within the United
States. The effect to be given the decrees was revealed by statements
of justice Cardozo in Sokoloff v. National City Bank.50 He indicated
that legal effect may be given acts or decrees of an unrecognized gov-
ernment which has achieved control over its territory, if "violence to
fundamental principles of justice or to our own public policy
might otherwise be done." 1 This is an "inversion" of the "public
policy" exception in conflict of laws rules.5 2 Normally where the
foreign law is applicable it will be resorted to except when the
particular act or decree is repugnant to the public policy of the
forum. 51 The Sokoloff rule indicates that the application of the
foreign law (applicable under conflict of laws rules) of an unrecog-
nized government is to be treated as an exception. Only when public
demands its application will the foreign law of the unrecognized
government be applied. This approach, however, is a repudiation of
the Pelzer doctrine and analogous to the position taken by the
courts in the Civil War cases. The approach seems sound in that
it relieves individuals of the particular hardships of confiscatory
legislation or acts and still allows courts to give effect to some non-
repugnant acts or legislation. It would seem, however, that the
same objective could be better achieved under the public policy
-exception without taking into consideration the fact of non-
recognition.
The Sokoloff principle was reiterated in James & Co. v. Second
48. Ibid. Fraenkel, supra note 25, at 567.
49. Werenjchik v. Ulen Contracting Corp., 229 App. Div. 36, 240
N. Y. Supp. 619 (3d Dep't 1930). See text to notes 58 to 60.
50. 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924).
51. Id. at 166, 145 N. E. at 919. There is some indication in the opinion
that Cardozo might have intended to limit the application of this principle
to confiscatory acts which are to be given effect only under unusual circum-
stances. Id. at 164, 145 N. E. at 918.
52. See Habicht, The Application of Soviet Laws and the Exception
of Public Order, 21 Am. J. Int'l L. 238 (1927).
53. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 612 (1934).
1952]
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Russian Ins. Co.54 where the defendant relied upon the Soviet
decrees as a defense to an action on certain insurance contracts. The
defendants first asserted that the corporation was dissolved by the
confiscatory decrees. justice Cardozo answered that since the cor-
poration had sufficient vitality to appear in the action, it had vitality
to be sued. Secondly, the defendant contended that its liability was
extinguished by the decrees. The court, however, concluded that not
even a recognized government could terminate the liability of a
corporation organized under American law. The decision required
no consideration of the effect of Soviet decrees qua Soviet decrees.
Nevertheless the court added as a ground for the decision that the
Soviet Government was unrecognized and public policy did not
require giving effect to its decrees.
The case of Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddards decided a
year later was the first case to give partial effect to the Soviet
decrees. In that case, a Russian corporation organized under
Russian law during the Czarist reign and authorized to do business
in New York brought suit in New York to revoke a trust and com-
pel the return of certain securities. The corporation had been na-
tionalized in Russia. Defendant relied upon this as a defense. The
court refused jurisdiction. One of the main reasons the court gave
for decision was that. the defendant might be subject to double
liability if the plantiffs were allowed to sue. This, of course, was
entirely possible since other countries had at this time accorded de
jure recognition to the Soviet regime and recovery against the
defendants in a suit brought by the Soviet regime might be per-
mitted abroad. In the later case of Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v. Na-
tional City Bank,56 however, a corporation organized under the
preceding government was allowed to bring an action at law to
collect a debt. The court discounted the possibility of double liability
since other countries had not been giving extraterritorial effect
to the decrees and also because this was an action at law rather than
in equity. The court, although referring to the decrees as mere
"exhibitions of power" rather than "pronouncements of authority,"
' 7
nevertheless continued to maintain its previous position that every-
day business transactions or domestic acts might be given effect. +
This series of cases indicates that the type of acts involved rather
54. 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369 (1925).
55. 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E_ 703 (1925).
56. 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479, cert. denied, 282 U. S. 878 (1930).
57. Id. at 28, 170 N. E. at 481.
58 Id. at 28-29, 170 N. E. at 481.
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than the fact of non-recognition was the important consideration
in determining their validity. There was only one case during this
period involving acts or legislation of the Soviet Government which
were not repugnant to the public policy of the state of New York.59
In that case the court, in upholding the validity of the act in ques-
tion said that determination of the legal effect of acts of an unrecog-
nized government upon private rights of individuals is a judicial
question, not a political one. Dictum in one case also indicated that
a marriage valid in Russia would be valid in this country.60
Since the fundamental question involved in these cases is the
extent to which courts will take into consideration the recognition
policies of the Executive Department, much can be learned about
the legal effects of non-recognition by examining post-recognition
cases. New York cases decided soon after the de jure recognition
of the Soviet Government indicated the continued policy of the
New York courts of attaching little importance to the fact of recog-
nition or non-recognition.6 ' The validity of the confiscatory decrees
was still denied where they conflicted with public policy. -6 2
Subsequent federal cases"3 and some recent New York cases, 64
however, indicate a trend toward giving greater effect to the recog-
nition policies of the State Department. The shift in attitude of
the courts began with United States v. Pink."' In that case, the
United States brought an action as an assignee of certain claims
of the Soviet Government based on the Soviet "nationalization"
decrees of 1918. This so-called "Litvinov Assignment" was part of
an executive agreement concluded with the Soviet Government
59. Werenjchik v. Ulen Contracting Corp., 229 App. Div. 36, 240
N. Y. Supp. 619 (3d Dep't 1930) (birth certificate issued by officials of
Soviet Russia allowed in evidence).
60. See Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F. 2d 202, 205(S.D. N.Y. 1929).
61. Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189
N. E. 456 (1934) ; see United States v. Manhattan Co., 276 N. Y. 396, 403-
404, 12 N. E. 2d 518, 522 (1938).
62. Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189
N. E. 456 (1934).
63. See United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 229-231 (1942); The
Maret, 145 F. 2d 431, 441-442 (3d Cir. 1944) ; The Florida, 133 F. 2d 719
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Tiedemann v. Estoduras Steamship Co.,
319 U. S. 774, rehearing denied, 320 U. S. 811 (1943) ; Steingut v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 58 F. Supp. 623, 629 (S.D. N.Y. 1944), aff'd as modified, 161 F.
2d 571 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 332 U. S. 753, cert. denied, 332 U. S. 807(1947).
64. Merilaid & Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 189 Misc. 285, 71 N. Y. S. 2d
377 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; In re Grauds' Estate, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 803 (Surr. Ct.
1943).
65. 315 U. S. 203 (1942). See Note, United States v. Pink-A Re-
appraisal, 48 Col. L. Rev. 890 (1948).
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simultaneous with the recognition by the United States of the
Soviets. The court held that extraterritorial effect must be extended
to the decrees notwithstanding the fact that they were repugnant
to the public policy of the state of New York." It is not clear
whether effect was given merely because Soviet Russia was at that
time a recognized government or that the executive agreement with
Russia prevailed over state policy.67 Subsequent lower federal court
opinions have indicated that the former view was the basis of the
decision."" New York cases decided after the Pink case seem to
interpret the case as requiring affirmative extraterritorial effect to
the decrees only when an executive agreement analogous to the
"Litvinov Assignment" is involved.69 This would seem to be the
more reasonable interpretation since otherwise greater effect would
be given to foreign acts or legislation that is accorded to states by
virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution.
7 0
Assuming that the Pink case does stand for the proposition that
recognition itself requires extraterritorial effect to be given the
decrees of a recognized government, does this mean that the fact
of non-recognition will automatically deny such effect? Recent New
York 71 and federal" decisions involving decrees of the unrecog-
66. The reason that New York public policy was an obstacle is that
federal courts must follow the substantive law of the state in which they
sit, Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), 22 Minn. L. Rev. 885,
including the state conflict of laws rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313
U. S. 487 (1941).
67. There is language in the opinion which does support the view that
courts are bound by recognition alone. United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203,
229, 231 (1942). Justice Stone in his dissent assumed that the grant of
recognition was the basis of the decision. Id. at 242 et seq. See also
Borchard, Extraterritorial Confiscations, 36 Am. J. Int'l L. 275, 279 (1942) ;
Note, 51 Yale L. J. 849 (1942). Most of the opinion, however, concerned
itself with the effect of the "Litvinov Assignment." United States v. Pink,
supra, at 221-234. See also Stevenson, Effect of Recognition on the Applica-
tion of Private International Law Norms, 51 Col. L. Rev. 710, 719-725
(1951).
68. See Steingut v. Guaranty Trust Co., 58 F. Supp. 623, 633 (1944),
aff'd as viodified, 161 F. 2d 571 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 332 U. S. 753.
cert. denied, 332 U. S. 807 (1947) ; Chemacid, S. A. v. Ferrotar Corp., 51 F.
Supp. 756, 758 (S.D. N.Y. 1943) ; see also The Maret, 145 F. 2d 431, 441-442
(3d Cir. 1944).
69. Bollack v. Societe Generale, 263 App. Div. 601, 603-604, 33 N. Y. S.
2d 986-989 (1st Dep't 1942) ; see Merilaid & Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 189
Misc. 285, 287, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 377, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
70. See United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 251-252 (1942) (dis-
senting opinion) ; Stevenson, supra note 67, at 722.
71. In re Grauds' Estate, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 803, 812 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
Non-recognition was given as an additional ground for refusing effect to
the decrees of the Baltic Republics in Merilaid & Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank,
189 Misc. 285, 287, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 377, 378-379 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
72. See The Maret, 145 F. 2d 431, 441-442 (3d Cir. 1944); The
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nized Baltic Republics 7 3 indicate that it may. One writer has
pointed out, however, that in each of these cases not only was the
government unrecognized but there was a State Department certifi-
cation of non-recognition of the validity of the particular act itself.7 '
A different conclusion by the courts as to the validity of the decrees
would, of course, be undesirable. The certification, however, was
not stressed as an important factor in either the New York or
federal decisions.
A more liberal attitude is present in a recent federal decision
involving the Communist Government of China.7 5 The court, al-
though denying the validity of the acts of the Communist Govern-
ment, indicated that our active intervention against the Communist
Government rather than the mere negative policy of non-recognition
was the basis of the decision. Moreover, in denying relief to the
Nationalist Government of China, the court gave limited recognition
to the de facto status of the Communist Government.
Heretofore, we have been concerned principally with the ex-
traterritorial effect of acts or legislation of the unrecognized govern-
ment. Acts or legislation purporting to have effect only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the unrecognized government have been
looked upon more favorably by the courts.76 In the leading case of
Salintoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,77 the Soviet Government had
confiscated all oil lands in Russia and sold the oil to the defendant.
The former owner brought suit for an accounting on the grounds
that the confiscatory decrees have no effect. The Court of Appeals of
New York affirmed the lower court order, dismissing the complaint.
The court concluded that since the Soviet Government was a gov-
ernment in fact, its decrees have force within its borders and over
its nationals.71
It is apparently well settled that the acts of a recognized govern-
ment within its territorial jurisdiction may not be questioned even
Florida, 133 F. 2d 719 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Tiedemann v. Esto-
duras Steamship Co., 319 U. S. 774, rehearing denied, 320 U. S. 811 (1943) ;
Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S. S. Line v. Clark, 80 F. Supp. 683, 684
(D. D.C. 1948), aff'd sub nomz. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S. S. Line
v. McGrath, 188 F. 2d 1000, cert. denied, 72 Sup. Ct. 30 (1951).
73. For an excellent discussion of the Baltic Republic cases see Briggs,
Non-Recognition in the Courts: The Ships of the Baltic Republics, 37 Am. J.
Int'l L. 585 (1943).
74. See Stevenson, supra note 7, at 725-727.
75. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 92 F.
Supp. 920 (N.D. Cal. 1950), appeal dismissed and cause remanded, 190 F.
2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1951).
76. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 252 (1897).
77. 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679 (1933).
78. Id. at 226-227, 186 N. E. at 682.
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though contrary to the public policy of the forum.70 The Salimoff
decision seems to indicate that this doctrine will be applied to un-
recognized governments. One writer has contended, however, that
such a conclusion is neither supported by the language of the court
or prior judicial development of the doctrine.80 But confiscatory
acts are contrary to the public policy of New York and yet declared
ineffective only when purporting to operate extraterritorially. An-
other writer has suggested two possible factors which influenced
the decision. 81 First, that the executive policy as set out in the
opinion closely bordered on de facto recognition; secondly, that
the party who obtained the confiscated goods was a United States
Corporation, and the party from whom the goods were confiscated
was a Soviet national.
Although the policy in favor of this so-called Act of State
doctrine itself seems questionable, 2 there appears to be no accept-
able reason for limiting its application to recognized governments.
The rationale of the doctrine is the fear that to question a particular
country's acts would "vex the peace of nations."8' 3 This applies
equally to unrecognized governments. A further reason for the Act
of State doctrine is the interest in protecting individuals who have
relied upon the acts of a recognized power.84 It could be asserted
that an individual should not rely upon the acts of unrecognized
powers. Stevenson argues that this is an unrealistic view since
American recognition policy most certainly precludes an individual
from determining when acts of an unrecognized government would
be nullities.85
CONCLUSION
This Note has been concerned with the basic question of what
materiality the fact of non-recognition has in determining whether
an existing government has the capacity to sue, immunity from suit,
or if its acts have any legal effect. The cases seem to indicate that an
unrecognized government cannot sue in our courts. It seems de-
sirable that, for the limited purpose of protecting its property or
79. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr~res Soci~t6 Anonyme, 163 F. 2d 246
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 772 (1947) (certain anti-semitic acts
of the Nazi Regime held not subject to judicial inquiry). See Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918) ; Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-
Gesellscbaft, 277 N. Y. 474, 14 N. E. 2d 798 (1938).
80. See Stevenson, supra note 67, at 713.
81. See Comment, 19 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 73, 79 (1951).
82. See Comment, 57 Yale L. J. 108 (1948).
83. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 303-304 (1918).
84. See Stevenson, supra note 67, at 718.
85. Id. at 718-719.
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funds invested in the United States, it be allowed to bring suit. The
unrecognized government is protected from suit. This protection,
however, may not extend to its property in in rein proceedings be-
cause of the particular procedure the government must follow in
asserting its immunity. Protection should be extended to this
situation.
It is not too clear what effect will be given to acts or. legislation
of the unrecognized government. The overall attitude of the New
York courts seems to indicate that the fact of recognition or non-
recognition will not be an important factor in determining the
validity of the acts or legislation. Federal decisions would give
a broader effect to the recognition policies of the State Department.
However, unless the Federal Government is a party to the proceed-
ings or has itself declared that the acts should not be given legal
effect, the validity of acts or legislation which affect only the private
rights or obligation of individuals or corporations should be deter-
mined without reference to the fact of nonrecognition or recognition.
The ordinary conflict of laws rules will prevent the application of
acts or legislation repugnant to the public policy of the forum. It
seems that the Act of State doctrine applies to unrecognized as well
as recognized governments. Although the doctrine itself may be
subject to criticism there seems to be no reason to limit its appli-
cation to recognized governments.
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